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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 09-50026(REG)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.
9	f/k/a General Motors Corporation, et al.,
10	
11	Debtors.
12	
13	x
14	
15	United States Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York
18	
19	December 2, 2010
20	9:52 AM
21	
22	
23	BEFORE:
24	HON. ROBERT E. GERBER
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

	Page 2
1	HEARING re Status Conference re: Disclosure
2	
3	HEARING re Debtors' Ninety-Seventh Omnibus Objection to Claims
4	(No Liability GMAC Debt Claims)
5	
6	HEARING re Debtors' Ninety-eighth Omnibus Objection to Claims
7	(Incorrectly Classified Claims)
8	
9	HEARING re Debtors' 10erd Omnibus Objection to Claims (Welfare
10	Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and Executive
11	Employees)
12	
13	HEARING re Motion for Relief from Stay filed by John F.
14	Townsend III on behalf of Timothy Bynum
15	
16	HEARING re Motion for Relief from Stay on behalf of Samuel
17	Barrow
18	
19	HEARING re Motion for Relief from Stay, Tracy Woody
20	
21	HEARING re Motion of Debtors Authorizing Estimation of Debtors'
22	Aggregate Liability for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims and
23	Establishing Schedule for Estimation Proceeding
24	
25	Transcribed by: Lisa Bar-Leib

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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Have seats, please. All right, GM Motors Liquidation. I'll hear first about where we stand on disclosure statement, then I'll deal with the asbestos matters. I'll deal with the Tracy Woody matter at the end. Mr. Karotkin?

MR. KAROTKIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen Karotkin, Weil Gotshal & Manges, for the debtors.

I'm pleased to report and I think that Mr. Jones and Mr. Mayer will confirm this, that an agreement has been reached among the U.S. Treasury, the creditors' committee, and the debtors with respect to all outstanding issues which were preventing the approval of the disclosure statement, and we expect to finalize all the wording in both the revised plan and disclosure statement in the next day or so, circulate a revised draft to the sixty people who filed formal objections, as you had directed us a month or so ago.

And what we would ask the Court to do is to schedule a hearing next week to the extent that any issues are raised by those sixty people, and to the extent there are any issues, they can be addressed at that time, and we would expect, Your Honor, at that point, to present to you an order approving the disclosure statement.

THE COURT: Well, obviously I'm pleased to hear the progress you made. In terms of giving you a hearing next week,

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Page 13 because other matters were put off and sandwiched in to deal 1 with the needs of this case, there isn't much room in the inn. I may be able to give you 8:00 o'clock in the morning on 3 Wednesday, the 8th before I get on a plane. 4 5 MR. KAROTKIN: That's fine. 6 THE COURT: I'll need to hear from you or one of your staff as quickly as possible to ascertain whether I need to use 7 that time or not. 9 MR. KAROTKIN: Okay. It would be our expectation, Your Honor, that the document would be finalized at the latest 10 11 tomorrow and would go out either by e-mail or Federal Express to those parties. 12 13 THE COURT: All right. I'll also have to let you know whether 8:00 o'clock works. I don't know whether I can 14 get other courtroom staff in that early. I'm not the problem, 15 16 but I can't proceed without an ECRO operator and without support by the Marshal Service. Let me know if we really need 17 18 that time as soon as you can. 19 MR. KAROTKIN: I quess the only issue, Your Honor, is 20 we won't know immediately whether those sixty people have 2.1 issues. THE COURT: Well, these are matters upon which I've 22 already ruled, and the only question is your implementation of 23 my rulings --24 25 MR. KAROTKIN: That is correct.

Page 14 THE COURT: -- am I correct? 1 2 MR. KAROTKIN: That is correct. I'm not really expecting anything substantive, I just don't know in terms of 3 if some issue comes up and we need to see you, that's the only issue. 5 6 THE COURT: All right. Just a minute, please. (Pause) 7 THE COURT: All right. Continue with your next 9 matter while I'm dealing with some of this, Mr. Karotkin. 10 MR. KAROTKIN: Mr. Smolinsky will deal with that. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Oh, wait, Mr. Mayer, are you rising for something? 12 13 MR. MAYER: Well, as part of the status report and disclosure statement, I have an understanding with the debtors 14 and the government that we would read --15 16 THE COURT: I'm having trouble hearing you, Mr. 17 Mayer. 18 MR. MAYER: I'm sorry. If we're still on the disclosure statement, Your Honor, part of my agreement with the 19 20 debtors and with the Treasury was that we would read into the record the essential elements of business points that had been 21 22 reached so that we put those to bed and they are done. THE COURT: Sure, there's a good time to do it. 23 Wait. Stand by for a minute. 24 25 MR. MAYER: Certainly.

Page 15 1 (Pause) 2. THE COURT: I'll give you 6:00 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, the 7th, Mr. Karotkin. 3 MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, sir. 5 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Mayer. 6 MR. MAYER: We won't take long, Your Honor, and I'm reading from a text which has been reviewed by both counsel to 7 Treasury and counsel to the debtors. 9 Number one, with respect to any recoveries from the 10 term loan litigation, which will be in the avoidance action 11 trust, recoveries from the term loan litigation will be paid to Treasury until Treasury has received an amount equal to all 12 13 fees and expenses, allocable to the term loan litigation, which were paid from the proceeds of Treasury's DIP wind-down loan 14 during the Chapter 11 case, or that will be paid from the 15 16 proceeds of the Treasury's DIP wind-down loan post-effective 17 date. 18 The amount will include all professional fees and disbursements incurred by counsel for the estate, including 19 20 Weil Gotshal, Kramer Levin and Butzel Long as plaintiff and all professional fees incurred by counsel to JPMorgan Bank, agent 21 22 as defendant, including Kelley Drye and Morgan Lewis or any other defendants that the estate is required to pay, if any, 23 and the fees and disbursements --24 25 THE COURT: Just a minute, please, Mr. Mayer.

Page 16 CourtCall, put everybody on the phone on mute, and give me an 1 acknowledgement that you've done so. 2. 3 (Pause) THE COURT: Well, I don't have the acknowledgement, 5 but continue, Mr. Mayer. 6 COURT CALL OPERATOR: Your Honor, everyone is on 7 mute. THE COURT: All right. MR. MAYER: All professional fees incurred by counsel 9 to JPMorgan Bank, agent as defendant, including Kelley Drye and 10 11 Morgan Lewis, or any other defendants that the estate is required to pay, if any, and the fees and disbursements of any 12 13 expert retained by any of them. With apologies for departing slightly from the 14 script, but as a summary, if there's an expense Treasury paid 15 16 in connection with this litigation, it comes back from the proceeds of the litigation, if any. That's basically the deal. 17 18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jones, do you have any 19 problems with what Mr. Mayer said? 20 MR. JONES: No, Mr. Mayer has accurately described 21 the agreement on this point. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Karotkin, I don't know if 22 you have skin in this game, but I take it you have no problems 23 24 either. 25 MR. KAROTKIN: No, sir.

Page 17 1 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine, Mr. Mayer. 2 MR. MAYER: Thank you, Your Honor. Second, with 3 respect to the GUC Trust Budget, that's General Unsecured Creditors' Trust, and the avoidance action trust budget, Treasury has agreed to a nine million dollar budget for the GUC 5 6 Trust's post-effective date fees and disbursements of GUC Trust general counsel. Any legal fees and disbursements in excess of 7 the nine million dollar budget would not be funded by proceeds 9 of the DIP credit agreement or wind-down loan agreement, and 10 absent any other source of funds, would be borne either by 11 counsel personally, or by the GUC Trust through the sale of 12 stock or warrants to raise funds. 13 Treasury confirms that the nine million dollars is not law firm specific. Treasury does not care which firm 14 15 represents the trust. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Jones? 17 MR. JONES: Also correct, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Karotkin? 19 MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, sir. 20 MR. MAYER: Treasury has further agreed to the budget for Wilmington Trust as GUC Trust administrator, and no further 21 22 back-up from Wilmington is required. Treasury has agreed to the budget for FTI as GUC Trust monitor. No further back-up 23 from FTI is required. 24 Treasury has agreed to the budget submitted by Butzel 25

Page 18 Long as special counsel to both trusts in connection with the 1 2 term loan litigation and the Nova Scotia litigation, no further 3 back-up from Butzel Long is required. THE COURT: Gentlemen? MR. JONES: David Jones again, Your Honor, from the 5 6 U.S. Attorney's office, also correct. 7 MR. KAROTKIN: I agree, sir. THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. MAYER: With respect to asbestos estimation, 10 Treasury has agreed to a four million dollar budget to cover fees and disbursements for the estimation of asbestos 11 liabilities incurred by counsel for the debtors, the official 12 13 committee of unsecured creditors, the asbestos creditors' committee, and the futures representative, and the experts 14 retained by each for the time period commencing November 1, 15 16 2010 through the conclusion of the estimation process. 17 THE COURT: This estimation asbestos business is 18 anticipated to cost us four million bucks? MR. MAYER: If we go all the way through a trial, 19 20 yes, Your Honor. 2.1 THE COURT: Mr. Jones? That is a correct statement of the 22 MR. JONES: agreement, Your Honor. I would say it's on an up to basis. 23 We'd be delighted if the number came in well below. 24 25 MR. MAYER: Nor, of course, does it commit Treasury

or anyone else not to examine people's fees and disbursements for reasonableness, and then of course, the Judge -- the Court remains free to do with the fees and disbursements as the Court sees fit.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. All right. Mr. Karotkin?
MR. KAROTKIN: We agree with Mr. Jones.

THE COURT: Okay. With respect to title to the term loan litigation, Treasury and the official committee of unsecured creditors will further consider the issue of ownership of the term loan litigation, following the December 3rd hearing on cross motions for summary judgment in the term loan litigation. That's tomorrow.

Treasury notes that the order approving Treasury's

DIP wind-down loan precludes the use of proceeds of the loans

to litigate against the DIP wind-down lenders. The plan shall

provide that paragraph twenty of that order, which contains

that prohibition, shall continue to apply to Motors Liquidation

Company, the GUC Trust and the avoidance action trust after the

effective date.

Treasury reserves its right to enforce this provision, including by objecting to allowance and payment of any fees or expenses incurred during the Chapter 11 case, or after the effective date on litigation over the term loan litigation.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones?

Page 20 MR. JONES: Your Honor, that's also correct. 1 2 statement as to the particular parties that it applies to is not understood by Treasury to limit more broadly the 3 effectiveness of the order or the paragraph, but we wanted --THE COURT: I lost you, Mr. Jones. 5 6 MR. JONES: -- specific assurance -- sorry. Your Honor, there's a specific statement in the 7 language Mr. Mayer just wrote, stating that the order shall 9 continue to apply specifically to MLC, the GUC Trust, and the avoidance action trust after the effective date, which is 10 11 correct, and I'm just noting that Treasury is not suggesting or taking the position that the order is in any way limited by 12 13 this provision. That states a particular application. MR. MAYER: We don't have a problem with that, Your 14 The basic deal is that whatever the orders says it 15 16 says, and it continues in full force and effect after the 17 effective date. That's the deal. 18 MR. JONES: That's correct, thank you. 19 THE COURT: Okay. MR. KAROTKIN: I assume we're talking about paragraph 20 twenty of that order? 21 22 MR. MAYER: Yes. 23 MR. KAROTKIN: Okay. MR. MAYER: Finally, the committee understands that 24 25 Treasury needs to review and sign off on the final final

disclosure statement and plan, and that, of course, is true for us, too. But the committee is done on the business points, and we expect to have a letter recommending that creditors vote for this plan when it goes out, and we are doing that on the understanding that when this plan and disclosure statement is finally printed and mailed, that means the Treasury is in support of it, too.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor, David Jones from the U.S. Attorney's office. As we've just confirmed on a line by line basis, Mr. Mayer has correctly stated the business agreement that the committee and Treasury has reached with the issues he just described.

We do need to reserve rights, pending our final review of documentation that just came in last night, and there may be one or two --

THE COURT: Reserving rights to ensure that the paperwork confirms your understanding of the deal, I take it, not to raise new issues?

MR. JONES: That is correct, Your Honor, and there is one small subissue not raised in these that we don't think will be a problem, that we need to finally confirm is done. We think we'll have that done within the day and I rise to indicate that based on our understanding of the deal as described by the record, and based on our understanding of

Page 22 agreements reached with the debtors, we are now in business 1 2 agreement on the plan subject to those reservations I just stated, and we hope to press to full final approval and agreement imminently, as within a day or certainly by the end 4 of the week. 5 6 THE COURT: All right. Anything else on plan and disclosure statement? 7 All right. Hearing nothing, I don't know if there are people who were here solely for that, but if they are, they 9 10 can leave. 11 MR. MAYER: Thank you, Your Honor. That includes a number of us including Ms. Sharret who unfortunately for me 12 13 will be taking an extended leave. THE COURT: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear you, Mr. 14 15 Mayer. 16 MR. MAYER: I'm sorry. I just wanted to acknowledge Ms. Sharret's work and to indicate that she will -- please 17 stand up, Jennifer. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. MAYER: She needs to take a week. Thank you, Your Honor. 21 22 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Smolinsky. MR. SMOLINSKY: Good morning, Your Honor, Joe 23 Smolinsky, Weil Gotshal and Manges for the debtors. 24 25 The next matter on the calendar is the motion seeking

authorization to estimate the aggregate amount of asbestos personal injury liability. Keeping with the theme, I believe we now have an agreement with respect to the first step, which is setting the schedule to allow for the preparation and prosecution of an estimation hearing before this Court, as we continue to use our best efforts to try to resolve these issues consensually.

Looking at the end date, which is the date under which a -- at which an estimation hearing would be held, we originally asked in our motion for a hearing to be scheduled towards the middle to end of February. Under the new schedule, we would be asking the Court to fix a date for the hearing as close as possible to the first week in March.

Backing up, the various dates that are set forth in our proposed order would be modified, some actually moving forward and some moving slightly backward, in order to accommodate that.

The only other issues with respect to the order as it was proposed is that the parties wanted to make clear, looking at the order, that the parties' exchange of exhibits that would be fixed by Your Honor, depending on how far in advance Your Honor would like those exhibits, would not include exhibits that are used for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal, but only for the case in chief.

And lastly, Your Honor, there's a provision,

subparagraph F of the order, which sets a date for the filing of pretrial briefs. I think the parties are unclear as to whether pretrial briefs would be desired or helpful to Your Honor prior to the estimation hearing.

THE COURT: To what extent do you have an understanding with the other parties as to whether there would be post trial briefs apart from pretrial briefs?

MR. SMOLINSKY: We do not provide for that in the order. Again, I think it's -- I think the parties are willing to look to Your Honor to decide what would be most helpful.

THE COURT: Well, I need briefs of one kind or another, Mr. Smolinsky, and I'll allow the others to weigh in on this, too.

MR. SMOLINSKY: My view is that if there are going to be briefs, they should be pretrial briefs, so that Your Honor is in a position to rule as quickly as possible after the hearing.

THE COURT: Fair enough. Everybody on these monster evidentiary hearings wants me to rule as soon as possible.

There are limits as to my ability to do that, and frankly I'm getting tired. I'm already tired.

To the -- let me rephrase that. Assuming, as I do, that you want prior rulings or rulings as quickly as possible, you'll have to give me briefs in advance and the expert reports as early as possible in advance, and I'll need to know, and

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this is a reprise from the Chemtura trial, which similarly had everybody in the world wanting me to rule as quickly as possible on a very complex hearing with a lot of expert testimony.

I'll need to know whether you're stipulating with each other that the expert reports can be taken as direct testimony, and can themselves be regarded as admissible, or on the other hand, whether anybody is raising hearsay objections to those, so that we have to go back and reinvent the wheel.

In my experience, most recently as a judge, also in the thirty years that I was a lawyer before that, in commercial cases, most of the time people were not of a mind to raise the technical hearsay objection that they're allowed to on an expert report, as long as there was an opportunity to crossexamine the expert.

But if there are hearsay objections to the expert reports, then I'm going to either need direct testimony much earlier than I otherwise would, or I will need you guys to understand that you're going to have to cool your heels for a decision much longer than you otherwise might.

Additionally, of course, I'm going to need logistic support from all of the feuding parties with respect to such matters as giving me all documents in word processing format and not just PDF and hard copy format.

You're the only one I've heard from so far,

Mr. Smolinsky, and I'm going to finish your thoughts, but at the least, I'm going to need that.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, I don't have much more to say, but let me address those issues in particular. The schedule as we've laid out, I think provides Your Honor with what we believe to be a significant amount of time in advance with the documents. The schedule would provide that expert reports would be filed by January 14th. Pretrial briefs would be filed by February 8th.

THE COURT: Just a minute, please. I -- your earlier motion or is it something that Mr. Swett or Mr. Esserman had submitted had contemplated that in addition to there being a first round of expert reports, there would be rebuttal reports. I could swear somebody was complaining of constitutional violations because of insufficient time to do rebuttal reports.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Where did you guys finally come to rest on that?

MR. SMOLINSKY: The rebuttal reports would be due by February 4th, which is in advance of the date February 8th for the filing of pretrial briefs. So if we have the hearing in the first week of March, the briefs would be in your hands pretty much a month prior.

THE COURT: Wait. You said briefs, but I take it you meant the two rounds of reports, expert reports?

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 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ SMOLINSKY: Yes, and then the pretrial brief by February 8th.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. SMOLINSKY: With respect to questions raised with respect to hearsay objections, I don't have a strong view I guess, but one suggestion may be that any hearsay objections can be raised in the brief, which again will be before you almost a month before the trial, so that you can consider those in advance of the trial.

THE COURT: All right. You understand that I was intending to make a distinction between underlying hearsay that might be included within an expert report, and the separate issue which some legal scholars debate as to whether the hearsay -- the expert reports themselves are hearsay.

Now, I think the law's pretty clear, subject to your rights to be heard, that experts are allowed to rely on hearsay in forming their opinions, but that the fact that they form their opinions on that basis does not make otherwise inadmissible hearsay admissible.

Now if either side has a different view, I'll give you an opportunity to be heard on it. But I -- when I am making findings, there is a fundamentally different way that I do it depending on whether or not I'm allowed to use an expert report as in substance, a proxy for the expert's direct testimony, and I don't expect you to respond to that this

Page 28 minute, but I expect you to let me know what your position on 1 that is well before the first week of March. 2. MR. SMOLINSKY: Fair enough, Your Honor. Generally, 3 I think we all understand that the expert reports would be 4 admissible generally, and we'll try to get you that 5 6 confirmation that you can treat it as such. 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SMOLINSKY: Subject to everybody else being 8 9 heard. 10 THE COURT: All right. Does that finish your 11 thoughts, Mr. Smolinsky? 12 MR. SMOLINSKY: It does. 13 THE COURT: All right. Then I need to hear from Mr. Bentley, Mr. Swett and Mr. Esserman. 14 MR. BENTLEY: Good morning, Your Honor, for the 15 16 record, Philip Bentley. 17 We support the positions that Mr. Smolinsky has 18 described, I quess, to run down the list in order, we also think that if Your Honor is amenable to not having post trial 19 20 briefs, we think that would be beneficial from a timing standpoint to not have them. 21 We certainly support the suggestion that I think Your 22 Honor was making that the parties eliminate any possible 23 hearsay issue by -- essentially by stipulating that the expert 24 25 reports can be deemed direct testimony by the experts.

Page 29 would support that stipulation and I hope the other parties 1 2. will as well. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Swett. MR. SWETT: Yes, sir. Trevor Swett, Caplin & 4 Drysdale for the official committee of unsecured creditors 5 6 holding asbestos related claims. Your Honor, we support the proposed schedule. It is 7 premised on the notion that we are heading into a classic 9 battle of experts with very little, if any, fact witness 10 testimony. And that has allowed us to streamline that, plus 11 the stipulation that we submitted earlier in the week, 12 eliminating the issue of significant discovery against third 13 party trusts, and solvent defendants, has allowed us to streamline this. 14 15 It seems to be a sensible proposal. We share the 16 view that the expert report should be available to you to 17 consider as evidence, and that the direct testimony of the 18 experts, if any, would be quite limited, so that the reports would stand as the core at least of their direct. 19 20 THE COURT: So the direct would be not much more than if called upon to testify or I hereby incorporate my expert 21 22 report as my direct testimony? MR. SWETT: Something along those lines. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Esserman. 24 25 MR. ESSERMAN: For the record, Sandy Esserman. The

Page 30 only additional comment I have is I've been involved in one 1 2 trial where the issue that Your Honor just raised did occur on expert reports. And the only thing I can tell the other parties, it was exceedingly difficult and frustrating for 4 5 everybody, including the attorneys when that issue was raised, 6 and obviously, I think Your Honor correctly identified it as an issue, and for the FCR, there's no way we would raise that 7 objection, especially me personally having been through that 9 trial, and I would urge everybody to accept the suggestion of 10 the Court, and I think the parties will, that expert reports, 11 unless there's otherwise an objection to them, not be objected to on the basis of hearsay. 12 13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Esserman, I think I hear either a consensus or an emerging consensus among the four 14 major players on this. 15 16 MR. ESSERMAN: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Since you seem to understand my concerns as well as anyone, I'm detailing you to take the leadership 18 19 role in papering a stip or consent order with the concurrence 20 of the other three players, in which the deal is memorialized. MR. ESSERMAN: I'll be happy to do it, Your Honor. 2.1 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. ESSERMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smolinsky. 24 25 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SMOLINSKY: So I think I

Page 31 have all the dates filled in, other than the one that we need 1 2 Your Honor for, which is the date for the commencement of the hearing. And again, the agreement that was reached subject to 3 Your Honor's approval was that we would target the first week 4 in March. 5 6 THE COURT: And by that, you mean like Tuesday, March 1 or are you talking about Monday the 7th or what? 7 MR. SMOLINSKY: Monday, March 1 would be okay with 9 us. THE COURT: March 1 isn't a Monday --10 11 MR. SMOLINSKY: Tuesday, Tuesday. THE COURT: -- according to my calendar. 12 13 MR. SMOLINSKY: Tuesday, I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, let me call in Ms. Blum (ph) again, 14 unless she never left. 15 16 (Pause) THE COURT: Mr. Smolinsky, did you say Tuesday, March 17 1st? 18 MR. SMOLINSKY: I did, Your Honor, but we were just 19 20 discussing an issue that Mr. Esserman has that we're trying to 21 navigate. 22 THE COURT: Would you guys want to discuss amongst 23 yourselves, or that you want me to be party to this negotiation with that? 24 25 MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, did you say that the 7th

Page 32 1 is also available? THE COURT: Don't go too far, Elaine. Huh? MR. SMOLINSKY: Did you say that the 7th was also 3 available? 4 THE COURT: I said it might be, I didn't say it would 5 6 be, that's why I asked Ms. Blum to come in. (Pause) 7 THE COURT: I sense that you're checking your 9 calendar, but I take it we're essentially talking about the 10 time that each of you guys needs to cross-examine your 11 opponents. Have you formed a view as to how much time you need 12 for that purpose? Remembering that the direct will have all 13 come in by expert report and by affidavit direct. MR. SMOLINSKY: Listening to the opinions, I would 14 say somewhere between one day and two days. 15 16 THE COURT: One and how many? 17 MR. SMOLINSKY: Two. 18 THE COURT: One and two. Okay. 19 (Pause) 20 MR. BENTLEY: Your Honor, I hate to upset the apple cart, but I think realistically with four expert witnesses, 21 cross-examination of each by multiple parties, and presumably 22 significant redirect since each party won't have done their 23 usual direct, I think realistically we're really talking three 24 25 days.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think that's absurd.

a three billion dollar contested valuation hearing, excuse me,

I think the final ruling was closer to two billion, we did the

whole thing in two days. Because I not only assume, but I

insist that allies coordinate with each other. But with that

said, I heard you, Mr. Bentley. Mr. Smolinsky, if you guys are

hot to get an early decision, I would suggest especially in

light of the concerns that Mr. Bentley articulated, that you

consider using as many of the days of the week beginning March

1st as possible.

MR. SMOLINSKY: I would have to agree with that, Your Honor, and we'll have Mr. Esserman address the Court, but to the extent that it's going to be a three-day trial, I would prefer to start on March 1st.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Esserman, let me hear your concerns.

18 (Pause)

THE COURT: Mr. Esserman.

MR. ESSERMAN: Your Honor, I'm generally in agreement, of course, with everything that has been said. My concern is there are certain other asbestos trust meetings that involve several of the experts that have been set for the week of March 1st; March 1st, 2nd and 3rd, and that is my concern with the dates. No other concern. I would hope we could all

Page 34 get it done in two days, also, but that's why --1 2. THE COURT: You're talking about in other cases? MR. ESSERMAN: Yes. We'll live with whatever 3 schedule Your Honor decides. I just wanted to raise it, we're 4 talking about three or four days here. 5 6 MR. SMOLINSKY: But those aren't hearings, those are meetings, aren't they? 7 MR. ESSERMAN: Yes, those are very large group 9 meetings, and some of the people involved are trustees of those 10 trusts, but. 11 THE COURT: Well, frankly, folks, I've tried to give people courtesies, but my ability to manage my calendar has 12 13 been pushed to the limit, and frankly, my predilections to be a customer friendly court have been pushed too far. They've been 14 pushed too far on matters of scheduling, they've been pushed 15 16 too far on people giving me eighty-page briefs, and I've stated 17 in other contexts that I have no interest in being a pawn in 18 the asbestos wars. 19 I will authorize you to arrange your witnesses, if 20 you can, to facilitate Mr. Esserman's concerns, because frankly I don't see the order in which I hear experts as making a 2.1 difference. 22 It would normally be the case since strictly speaking that this is an estimation motion brought by the 23 debtors, that the debtors' expert would be crossed first in any 24 25 event, and then it would be my inclination to take the

Page 35 creditor's committee's expert next. Which if we begin on 1 2 Tuesday, March 1st, would very possibly give you at least one day where you know you don't have to put your witnesses up 3 anyway for cross. 4 But frankly, gentlemen, that's as far as I'm of a 5 6 mind to go. MR. ESSERMAN: Your Honor, that's fine, we'll live 7 with it. I just wanted to raise the issue and we'll accept 8 whatever Your Honor decides. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. ESSERMAN: It's not a problem. THE COURT: All right. 12 13 MR. ESSERMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: So you're going to have Tuesday, March 14 1st as the starting time for the hearing, 9:45 unless you want 15 16 to begin at an earlier time. You can have starting as early as 8:30 if you want. I'm going to give you Wednesday the 2nd, and 17 I would prefer frankly to -- if we need to go on, to finish up 18 19 that same week. 20 Is there anybody here who's religious who can't go past 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock on Friday? I mean, a player in the 21 22 case, obviously -- in this controversy, obviously? 23 No? All right. So I would hope and expect we can get all testimony in the week beginning Tuesday, March 1st. 24 25 Now, although I don't look for post trial briefs,

Page 36 it's my custom to permit closing argument, oral argument and 1 2 legal argument, and have you guys talked about how much time 3 you need for that? MR. SMOLINSKY: No, Your Honor, that's maybe 4 something that we can discuss amongst ourselves and include in 5 6 the order when it's submitted. THE COURT: Okay. Any disagreement with what 7 Mr. Smolinsky just said? Then that's the way we'll do it. 9 Okay. MR. SMOLINSKY: Well, thank you very much, Your 10 11 Honor. We will circulate an order, a proposed order, and then 12 submit it to the Court. 13 THE COURT: Okay. A reminder, folks. When direct testimony affidavits come in, I need them in word processing 14 format, as well as PDF format. And I want all the expert 15 16 reports in word processing format also. And I assume that in 17 this type of matter there is likely to be very little, if any, 18 contractual language or language from other documents which wouldn't be available in word processing that would be of 19 20 significance in deciding this. But if there is, I'll need any 21 such language in word processing format as well, so I don't have to make my chambers staff key in all sorts of contractual 22 documents. 23 Also going to remind you for the nine hundredth time 24 25 to keep lawyerisms out of your briefs and your submissions.

don't need to know debtor's social or social security numbers or EINs, or even the last four digits of them. I don't need to know the history of the case. I want the submissions to focus on the issues that are before me. With that said, this is going to be handled as a contested matter and not as an adversary proceeding, and therefore, no pretrial order will be required. I think that was implicit, but I'll say it explicitly.

Okay. Anything else, Mr. Smolinsky?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Not in that matter, Your Honor. The next matter is the Tracy Woody motion for relief from the stay. If you'd like, we can skip over that and handle the rest of the calendar. It should only take a few minutes.

THE COURT: If there are other people in the courtroom besides on the Tracy Woody matter for any of your other stuff, which I take it it's largely or wholly undisputed, you can clear that, and then I'll deal with Woody.

CourtCall, you can now put Ms. Woody off mute.

Go ahead, Mr. Smolinsky.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. Moving to the uncontested matters, the debtors' ninety-seventh omnibus objections to claim, there was one outstanding claim that had not yet been resolved. We have now worked that out, and we're ready to submit an order, which would expunge that claim. That claim is a claim filed on account of GMAC bonds that was

mistakenly interposed thinking that GMAC is related to GM.

So with that order being entered, that would resolve omnibus objection number ninety-seven. We'll submit that order to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Resolved matters, we have two other motions to -- for relief from the stay today. The first one is filed by Timothy Bynum. We have resolved that matter by stipulation, which will be submitted to Your Honor.

We have agreed to lift the stay to permit Mr. Bynum to pursue his claim in Indiana state court. This is a matter in which an insurance company, Arch Insurance Company is defending a co-defendant, as well as MLC. So we've agreed to lift the stay to allow that case to continue. The insurance company will defend, and Mr. Bynum has agreed not to assert any claims against MLC or any of the other debtors.

THE COURT: Oh, fine.

MR. SMOLINSKY: The next item is a motion for relief from the stay from Samuel Barrow. We have resolved that motion by our agreement to put Mr. Barrow's proof of claim into our ADR process, so we have a stipulation that dictates that we will designate the claim for ADR and mediation by no later than December 31st, 2010.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Lastly, Your Honor, at the end of the

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Page 39 calendar, we have a section on withdrawn matters. One of which is the 2004 brought by the committee, a withdrawal has been filed with respect to that. Next we have the Boyd Bryant's (ph) motion to allow them to file a class proof of claim. Your Honor will recall that we settled that matter and a judgment was entered, so there's no reason to go forward with that motion, and a withdrawal notice was submitted --THE COURT: Just a minute, please, Mr. Smolinsky. Ms. Woody, is that you who's making the noise or, CourtCall, I assume you haven't unmuted anybody else? COURTCALL CLERK: Yes, Your Honor, the background noise is coming from Ms. Woody's line. THE COURT: All right. Ms. Woody, I need you to be quiet, please, until it's your turn to be heard. Every time you rustle papers or do noisy things at your desk, it gets magnified and amplified in my courtroom. Go ahead, Mr. Smolinsky. MR. SMOLINSKY: The last two, Your Honor, which is the debtor's ninety-first omnibus objection to claim and debtors' a hundred and seventh omnibus objection to claim, we have agreed to withdraw the motion with respect to the last remaining claim in each of those matters.

So for purposes of cleaning the court docket, we

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and the rest of the objection could be marked off calendar as resolved.

THE COURT: Of course, sure.

MR. SMOLINSKY: And that, I believe, leaves with us Ms. Woody's motion.

oral argument. It's your motion. I do have a few questions of both sides. First, I saw an indication in the debtor's response that there were settlement negotiations that were being considered or ongoing, and I'd like to know what happened to them, since I would've thought that the cost of litigating this motion could exceed the amount of the cost of repairs or damage to the vehicle.

I also did not see in this thick package, but I may have missed it, the actual ruling by the North Carolina state court, but Ms. Woody, I didn't see any reply by you that would cause me to quarrel with what the debtors said about the claim being found to be untimely, although the words that the debtor used struck me as odd. Certainly, I don't rule that way. Time barred and/or failed as a matter of law, I would've thought that most judges would be more specific in saying what they're ruling on and why.

Ms. Woody, you didn't deal with the Sonnax factors, which are the factors that a judge in my circuit, the 2nd Circuit, must take into account in deciding whether or not to

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grant relief from the stay. And, of course, there are many, many precedents where I have ruled, principally by dictated decisions on others' requests for relief from the stay, which so far as I recall, I have denied in every instance, and I guess the question I have is why this case should be regarded as different than the others, and why the precedents of the others don't equally apply here.

So with that said, I'll hear first from you, Ms. Woody.

MS. WOODY: First of all, Your Honor, I would like to apologize. My daughter is actually sick and she was coughing.

I was just trying to let her know I was on the phone with the Court.

But in any event, I believe that there are certain bankruptcy procedures that has to be followed regarding General Motors. I believe I was supposed to be sent a proof of claim and possibly a notice of creditor's meetings, because -- a meeting, because I know that they, General Motors, was aware of the lawsuit that I filed against them as the manufacturer.

I purchased a vehicle that was part of a lawsuit against General Motors, regarding some manufacturing defects in the vehicle, and I filed my case regarding this within the three-year period. And I did not receive a proof of claim from the attorney for General Motors. I didn't receive any notice of creditor's meetings.

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The only thing I received was this Chapter 11 confirmation and a letter previously telling me that GM was in bankruptcy, and that I should dismiss my case, or sanctions may be imposed upon me. That's the letter I received from the attorney's office for GM.

So I wasn't aware of the deadline, of any deadline for a claim, but at this point, I'm still an interested party.

I still have a Wayne County court -- district court case against which General Motors is one of the parties, that I'm going to get in against because of manufacturing defects to the vehicle and the damages and so forth that pursued (sic).

And as far as the bankruptcy, it is not set up to protect any misrepresentation of a product or any type of -- I mean, I was sold the product saying that the vehicle was in good shape, that it had been tested, there was no problem with it.

When I took the vehicle to a car mechanic, as a matter of fact, General Motors is the one that sent this litigation or lawsuit information a year after the warranty was over, and it mentioned as long as -- well, the mechanic mentioned that was working on my car, mentioned that the speedometer defect had to be repaired by the manufacturer, and the vehicle I had was down for several months.

And he mentioned -- we had a long conversation, the mechanic and I, and there were some issues with the

manufacturer, it was some manufacturer defects. And what concerned me is that the vehicle stopped while I was driving, and I had my children in the car, and my elderly mother. And we stopped, actually it stopped while we were driving, and we were right there in a dead curve where somebody could've really hit us, and we could've had a horrible accident.

But in any event, the ruling for the Wayne County
District Court was -- the attorneys had mentioned that I had
not filed the claim or the cases -- I should say the case, I
didn't file to serve it or serve it with the proper subpoenas
and so forth, which I'm not sure what happened to those
subpoenas, but I -- as far as everything was filed and even
served a second time around to the attorneys that these
defendants, including General Motors. And I don't know how
that paperwork got missing. I guess it was just a clerical
error. But I had sent copies of all of the subpoenas. I
reissued those subpoenas from the courthouse, from the clerk,
who signed off on them, and they received those as well.

So actually the order, as far as the Court, and I have a jurisdiction was not appropriately -- filed. So I filed the motion to set that order aside, and that's where we're at at this point.

And I listed the specific information about General Motors and why the liability is still an issue, and it really stems from a letter that -- also it kind of came from them,

Page 44 which says that -- and I filed this with my proof of claim as 1 2. an interested party, which states that General Motors -- the description of the lawsuit was it was a class action lawsuit, 3 and my vehicle is one of the vehicles that's listed in here, a 4 2003 Chevrolet Suburban, and it mentions --5 6 THE COURT: Pause, please, Ms. Woody. Your lawsuit was not a class action lawsuit, right? 7 MS. WOODY: No, it wasn't. It wasn't part of the 9 class action lawsuit, no, sir, it wasn't. THE COURT: No, I don't understand. You're saying 10 11 you were a member of a class, of somebody else's class action 12 lawsuit? 13 MS. WOODY: Oh, no, sir. I'm saying that I'm referencing that there was other plaintiffs that have filed a 14 lawsuit against General Motors regarding the same issues that I 15 16 had filed a lawsuit against. 17 THE COURT: What does that have to do with you? MS. WOODY: Well, it's just that there are other 18 19 cases out there with the same type of problem, or there were 20 other cases out there with the same type of problems that I had with my vehicle, with the manufactured defects. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to talk about the Sonnax factors? 23 I'm sorry? 24 MS. WOODY: 25 Do you want to be heard on what GM said THE COURT:

Page 45 about the Sonnax factors? 1 2. MS. WOODY: Sonnax factors? THE COURT: Yes. If you don't know what they are --3 MS. WOODY: No. 4 THE COURT: -- then I'll rule on them based --5 6 because I know what they are. But you don't want to speak to 7 that; am I correct? MS. WOODY: I'm not aware of what the Sonnax factors 9 are at this point. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. 11 MS. WOODY: Uh-huh. THE COURT: Do you have a copy -- well, I'll ask 12 13 Mr. Smolinsky. Did the North Carolina court issue its ruling in writing? Hello? Are you still with me, Ms. Woody? 14 MS. WOODY: Oh, yes, I'm sorry. I didn't know if you 15 16 were talking to an attorney. There was a ruling about the court not having subject matter. It was an issue with the 17 18 subpoenas, but as I mentioned, I have asked that that motion be set aside, so that's going to be scheduled for court, but 19 20 before I can schedule that, I needed to have a motion for relief so I can continue showing the judge that in the file, 21 22 all the subpoenas, and they were all issued. I've sent 23 certified copies and so forth of all the information. So that order, you know, is not correct. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. I'll hear

Page 46 from Mr. Smolinsky now. Mr. Smolinsky, start with, did the 1 2. North Carolina court issue its ruling in writing? MR. SMOLINSKY: It did, Your Honor, and I'm just --3 through my investigation from my office. The reason why it 4 wasn't -- we didn't attach it to the papers, was that it didn't 5 6 say anything substantive. It merely stated that GM's motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety, and 7 plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. THE COURT: When it said GM, did it make a 9 distinction between Old GM and New GM? 10 11 MR. SMOLINSKY: I would have to say they were talking about New GM, because that's the one who filed the motion for 12 13 summary judgment, and we had already worked out with Ms. Woody that we were severed from that case. So I wouldn't --14 certainly wouldn't assume that the judge was dismissing the 15 16 case as to us. 17 THE COURT: All right. Continue. 18 MR. SMOLINSKY: And plaintiff's complaint is 19 dismissed in its entirety, as asserted against General Motors 20 LLC f/k/a General Motors Company, s/h/a General Motors Company/severally a division of GM/General Motors Corp., and 21 that's all it said. 22 So we paraphrased, based on what the motion for 23 summary judgment was, which was based on a timeliness --24 25 I don't quarrel with your paraphrase, Mr. THE COURT:

Page 47 Smolinsky, but without being critical of another judge, without understanding the basis upon which the other judge ruled, I have some difficulty applying res judicata or collateral estoppel. MR. SMOLINSKY: I don't dispute that, Your Honor, and I don't think that we're arguing that the judge has already dismissed the case as to us. THE COURT: Okay. You don't need to repeat yourself on the Sonnax factors. Ms. Woody says she never got a proof of claim form or got timely notice of the need to file a claim, even though there was apparently ongoing communications between her and GM's counsel down in North Carolina. Do you have any facts relevant to that? MR. SMOLINSKY: I don't, Your Honor, other than the fact that we did our best to notify parties to actions and threatened actions, using information that was provided by, at that time, New GM. I can't confirm or deny today whether Ms. Woody was on that list. I did hear her say that she knew that the bankruptcy was filed at the time, but other than that, I would have to do some further investigation. THE COURT: Okay. Well, again, I don't have a problem with you or your firm, Mr. Smolinsky, but other people

controversy may not have done all the things that -- let's just

who have gotten involved in one way or another in this

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say that best practices would've suggested that they could've or should've done.

You don't need to repeat yourself on Sonnax factors.

Is there anything else you want to talk about, Mr. Smolinsky?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Other than to just, you know, confirm for the record that this action was filed after our bankruptcy was filed, and so when you look at the first Sonnax factor, there are several matters that are not North Carolina state court issues, but would have to come back to the bankruptcy court for, such as whether the North Carolina action is voided as a matter of law for violating the stay, whether any judgment is unenforceable for the failure to file a proof of claim, or whether any claims, an expressed warranty claim that would be assumed by New GM, or a retained liability under the master sale and purchase agreement.

With respect to the settlement, you know, we have tried to take a very practical approach in this case. We have resolved a number of cases in similar situations where there hasn't been proofs of claim. We think that the bankruptcy environment is the best way to do that in. I think we made --we spoke to Ms. Woody twice, and offered at each time a settlement offer, which I think was very generous, relative to I think the amount of her repairs, and those offers were rejected.

I don't want to violate Rule 408, I'm happy to

disclose what the offer was, if Your Honor is interested, but so far we have not been able to resolve it. I think the practicality and the efficiency of this case is the important issue here. I think that we can deal with this claim here in the bankruptcy court. I fear very much that to the extent that this moves back to North Carolina, that we're going to be mired in litigation for a long time over a claim of a very small amount.

THE COURT: All right. Everybody, have a seat, please. Mr. Smolinsky and Ms. Woody, I'm now going to rule.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am denying relief from the stay. Which means, Ms. Woody, that I am denying permission for you to proceed in North Carolina, but will also be issuing a supplemental order in the interest of justice, which I will describe in a moment.

The narrowest issue before me is whether you, Ms. Woody, should be allowed to proceed with further litigation in North Carolina; and a motion of that character is governed by twelve factors that I am directed by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals to consider, which are known as the Sonnax factors, S-o-n-n-a-x, as described in a case reported at 907 F2d 1280.

Those factors overwhelmingly weigh in favor of me exercising my discretion, which the case law permits me to do, to deny relief from the stay.

The first Sonnax factor is whether relief would

result in a partial or complete resolution of the issues. Here that depends on how you would define it. It appears that the -- a decision was issued insofar as General Motors LLC, what I call New GM, would be concerned. Here the litigation would proceed, presumably it could result in a resolution of the issues with respect to Old GM, but at the same time, the North Carolina state court judge might rule that the same reasons that he gave for ruling in favor of New GM would also apply to Old GM, if in fact, he didn't have that in mind already. I can't be sure.

So this factor, when it's present in a clear way, normally weighs in favor of granting relief from the stay, but here it either is a wash or tilts against it. Lack of any connection with or interference with the bankruptcy case is the second factor, and that weighs materially in favor of Old GM here.

There have been many, I don't remember how many similar motions that we've dealt with before where people want to proceed with litigation against Old GM all around the country, and the cost of defending these is a burden upon all of GM's creditors, and creates both interference and burden on that.

We do have a claims process for dealing with this type of stuff. I'm going to come back to the claims process later. But that's the way that a claim of this character

should be dealt with, not by litigating in North Carolina.

Whether the other proceeding involves the debtor as a fiduciary weighs in favor of relief from the stay when it's applicable, but here it's not applicable.

Factor number four is whether a specialized tribunal with the necessary expertise has been established to hear the cause of action, and that factor weighs in favor of granting relief from the stay when it applies. But when it doesn't apply, it's either a wash or tilts against it.

The fifth factor is whether the debtor's insurer has assumed full responsibility for defending it, and like some of the predecessors, it weighs in favor of granting relief from the stay when it's applicable, but here it does not apply. So it is either a wash or tends to weigh against relief from the stay.

Whether the action primarily involves third parties; well, again when this factor is present, it tends to weigh in favor of granting relief from the stay. There obviously here is one third party, which is New GM, but which is no longer in the case, and now as a practical matter, all we're talking about is whether these claims should be heard in the claims process or down in North Carolina. So this factor is at most a wash or alternatively, weighs against relief from the stay.

Factor number seven is whether litigation in another forum would prejudice the interests of other creditors, and in

a different context I talked about this. This is indeed prejudicial to the other creditors because they would have to bear the cost of litigation by Old GM in North Carolina, which is unfair to them. Those factors weighs materially in favor of denying relief from the stay.

Whether the judgment claim arising from the other action is subject to equitable subordination is factor number eight. And here, under the facts, this factor doesn't apply at all or alternatively is regarded as a wash. It just doesn't apply.

Factor number nine is whether movant's success in the other proceeding would result in a judicial lien avoidable by the debtor. This too doesn't apply.

Factor number ten, which is one of the most important, is the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation. This relates to a couple of the others and this weighs heavily against granting relief from the stay.

I can deal with the matters of judicial economy much more quickly and easily in the claims process, and going back to start up a whole new litigation in North Carolina is going to be exactly the opposite of being expeditious or economical, and is exactly the kind of thing that the interests of judicial economy say that I would be nuts to do.

Factor number eleven, whether the parties are ready

for trial in the other proceeding is a factor that when it applies weighs in favor of granting relief from the stay, but here it doesn't apply. So once more, it's either a wash or tends to vote or weigh against granting relief from the stay.

Impact of the stay on the parties and the balance of harms, is here essentially a wash. I can grant whatever relief is in the interest of justice as well, and most likely quicker than the North Carolina court could.

So for the foregoing reasons, I'm exercising my discretion to deny relief from the stay. With that said, I take Ms. Woody at her word when she said she didn't get notice of a deadline for filing claims. And I wasn't a fly on the wall, so I don't know what Ms. Woody was told by the lawyers for New GM, who were defending that lawsuit down in North Carolina, but if it is true, as Ms. Woody alleges, that she had all these conversations with these guys and they never told her about the fact that she'd need to file a claim and the deadline for doing that, that's a matter of concern to me.

So what I'm going to do is, Ms. Woody, I'm going to give you thirty days from the date that GM gives you service of the order denying your motion for relief from the stay, to file a proof of claim for the costs that you claim that you were suffered. And if you file a proof of claim, then you will get the same distributions as other creditors of GM with prepetition claims get, to the extent that there is either

agreement on what your damages should be or I, as a judge, resolve it.

That does not mean that if by way of example, you file a proof of claim for nine thousand dollars, you're going to get a check for nine thousand dollars. First of all, it's only what your damages actually are, and second, you're going to get the same amount on a claim that other creditors get.

And I don't know exactly what a claim is worth in this case, but let's say it's fifteen or twenty cents on the dollar, that's what we're talking about, and it might be less for that matter. I just don't know, I don't know what the value of the stock that is going to ultimately go to creditors is, but that's the way it's going to be.


This ruling is, of course, without prejudice to the rights of Old GM or its creditor's committee to object to the proof of claim if one is filed, and I would encourage you,

Ms. Woody, considering how little a claim may be worth, to seriously consider any settlement that GM might offer you, but ultimately that's your decision, not mine.

Mr. Smolinsky, you're to settle an order in accordance with this dictated ruling, saying in substance that for the reasons set forth on the record, the motion for relief from the stay is denied, but also providing that Ms. Woody will have thirty days to file a proof of claim, and if she does file a proof of claim that this ruling is without prejudice to

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Page 55 everybody's rights on whether or not that proof of claim should 1 be allowed. 2. The time to appeal from this determination will run 3 from the date of entry of the order, and not from today, and 4 the usual fourteen-day stay of effectiveness of the order under 5 6 Bankruptcy Rule 4001 will remain in effect. 7 All right. I believe we're done, folks. Mr. Smolinsky? 9 MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, I would just note that Ms. Woody is free to contact me at the number on the papers or 10 Breanna Benefield (ph) who she spoke to several times, if she 11 wants to bypass the proof of claim process and see if we can 12 13 just reach agreement. MS. WOODY: I can barely hear, I'm sorry. 14 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smolinsky, pull the 15 16 microphone real close to you and just repeat to her so she can hear what you just told me. 17 18 MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, I was just making the 19 offer that if Ms. Woody wanted to try to bypass the proof of 20 claim process, that she's free to call me at the number on our papers or Breanna Benefield who she has spoken to on several 21 22 occasions. THE COURT: Okay. Did you follow that, Ms. Woody? 23 I did, and thank you very much. 24 MS. WOODY: 25 Have a nice day. We're adjourned. THE COURT: Okay.



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